Briefly on the topic of Gryzlov’s visit, as readers ask.
Since my talks were not invited, and the transcript of the negotiations to put anybody in no hurry, on their internal content can be built only some speculation, because the texture itself is not very much. Remarkably, in the media, this visit provoked a similar reaction – we have intensified the cries that Gryzlov went to drain the Donbass, Ukraine has intensified the cries that Gryzlov came to put an ultimatum to Poroshenko and arrival Gryzlov is trade.
I think so:
1. A month marks exactly one year the 2nd version of the Minsk agreements. Although all stakeholders as the parrots continue to broadcast about there is no alternative to the Minsk agreements, not one of their points is still not finished, including the most basic, about the exchange of prisoners all for all, not to mention fundamental questions about the ceasefire (front as streamed myrrh and myrrh-streaming), elections in the Donbas or border control. The deadlock complete. The reason of the deadlock is clear: the Russian Federation can not agree with the US on Ukraine because of different visions of the future of this country and Russia’s place in this future. The conflict continues to deepen and expand, exacerbating the contradictions of the Russian Federation and the USA on the territory of other countries, primarily in Syria, where Russia is trying to use the success on the local theatre to weaken the overall position of the United States and force them to abandon the categorical positions. The US in here have had a painful flick on his nose, and Obama made a clown a loser all failed middle East policy of the United States. The White House of course this insult will not be forgotten, even though Obama is essentially a lame duck, which long left. Therefore, it is hardly possible to expect easing of the American position on Syria and Ukraine, and therefore the logic of the conflict will prevail.
2. Attempts to implement the Minsk agreement will be of course, but due to the different reading of the agreements by the parties to fulfil them in the form in which they were taken will not work. Inserting the Donbas to Ukraine in the American interpretation, which is implemented by the junta, would mean absolute defeat of the Russian Federation, which will entail the loss of considerable resources pumped into the DPR and LPR, will exacerbate the situation with Crimea and it is highly likely in light of the economic crisis will cause in-country implications are similar to the defeat in the Russo-Japanese war. Therefore, the scenario of surrender and complete withdrawal from Ukraine and was rejected in the fall of 2014. Exactly the same as before that was rejected by the Big new Russia, which was considered in the spring of 2014 could result in a cold war with the West (which, incidentally, still happens).
3. For the United States and Ukraine, to implement Minsk agreements in the Russian interpretation means to accept the actual federalization of Ukraine, the erosion and the fragmentation of the control of Washington over this country, expanding the capabilities of the Russian presence in Ukraine at the expense of control over individual regions – or independently, or aspiring to that status. The realization of such a scenario naturally raises a block in the way of involvement of Ukraine in military infrastructure of NATO and its use as a springboard for further anti-Russian actions, and forcing Poroshenko to rewrite the Constitution under the Russian requirements, which will lead to having to reformat the current configuration of the junta, ejecting her from all the hawks. Of course, in an ongoing conflict, the junta is trying to wag under the previously announced “plan Gorbulina” on the one hand can not force Russia to accept the American interpretation of the Minsk agreements, on the other hand it could not accept the Kremlin’s interpretation, hence the procrastination with the amendments to the Constitution.
4. Why this question is important because when the question on the constitutional amendments will be passed the next bifurcation point. The adoption of the Constitutional amendments in accordance with the Kremlin’s position on Ukraine obviously will be perceived as a concession and will lead to internal political crisis in Ukraine. The refusal to accept these requests – will exacerbate the crisis of the Minsk process and it is highly likely to military escalation, which would be a way to redraw the position on the Board to resume negotiations with other positions. Question of the border at the moment has disappeared and is remembered extremely rare, because he is set in direct dependence on the format of Ukraine will be determined introducing a constitutional change.
5. By and large it’s not even a choice of Ukraine, to determine promising options for the development of events in Ukraine will primarily Washington, as a result of which much depends. If Russia is interested in freezing intense conflict in Ukraine by virtue of employment in Syria and the General desire to de-escalate the relations with the United States, Washington under Obama more interested in slow, but not kupirovano the conflict, which allows you to implement the strategy of Obama – to force Russia to withdraw from Ukraine’s complex political, economic, media and military action precluding a direct conflict between the US and Russia, but for Russia increasing the price of resistance to the U.S. desire to nullify the influence of the Russian Federation to Ukraine. In this respect, the situation with the Constitution of Ukraine is a kind of puzzle for Washington, the solution of which depends the intensity of the conflict. And so the cries about zradu in Ukraine, as the unexpected arrival of Gryzlov and his talks with Poroshenko were perceived as the Ghost of separate negotiations, separate from the United States.
6. What could bring Gryzlov? Proposals for federalisation in exchange for the execution of Minsk. The threat of a renewal of intense war in the Donbass. Local proposals for the implementation of individual clauses of the Minsk agreements (such as the exchange of prisoners including Savchenko and the prisoners “of grouchnikov”) it is possible to guess only. The real price of this visit can be seen in the upcoming negotiations in Minsk, the main content of which in recent months was expressed by the phrase “have agreed to negotiate on” and vote in Parliament on amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine at the end of January. After the issue of the amendments to the Constitution, the situation is likely to change qualitatively and for Russia, and for Ukraine and Donbass. In what direction – depends on the United States. Despite the delusional screaming about the fact that the US leave the Ukraine, on the fact that Washington currently leads the game and the issues of war and peace are in the hands of the “dark Lord”. Gryzlov your visits and statements can affect it only very indirectly, as a maximum by highlighting the different proposals or threats to the representatives of the main opponent of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. So the ball is now thrown over to the Americans and it remains to be seen where and how will be followed by a return flow.
If we want to give, then it seems to me that the parties made concessions and compromises most likely will not go casually and conflict will continue in force and objective on the moment of the fatal contradictions.